Much has been written about how the American War of Independence (1775)(1776)(1777)(1778)(1779)(1780)(1781)(1782)(1783) affected the British Isles. However, within this body of work there is limited reference to Liverpool -a British port-town that was arguably becoming 'the second city of empire'. This article attempts to fill this gap in the historiography by analysing the economic impact of the war upon this town. It shows that there were four overall stages to Liverpool's foreign commerce during this conflict -initially trade remained broadly steady, then there was a noticeable decline, the penultimate stage marked a sluggish improvement, and finally it was not until the post-war years that a stronger economic recovery took place. That said, despite these overall trends, individual markets, such as the trans-Atlantic slave trade, often had their own dynamics.
Introduction
The War of American Independence (1775-1783) was brought about by socioeconomic, political, and ideological differences between Great Britain and thirteen of its North American colonies. It was a significant imperial conflict because not only did it mark a civil war within the British Empire, but these years also witnessed power struggles between rival empires. Indeed, France, Spain, and the United Provinces (the Netherlands) became belligerents against Britain in 1778, 1779, and 1780, respectively. 1 The outcome was the humbling of British imperial power, and the birth of the United States.
Stephen Conway has written at length about how the War of Independence impacted upon the UK. Amongst other things, it fractured opinion along religious and socioeconomic lines. 2 The American War also affected the UK economy, not least that there was increased demand for manufactured goods (to support the armed forces), and a rising tax burden. 3 However, Conway's publications rarely mention the northern English port town of Liverpool. Granted, these works broadly deal with the impact of the war upon Britain and Ireland, and therefore cannot possibly look in detail at every community. Yet these infrequent references to Liverpool are unfortunate because, as we shall see, this was an important domestic and imperial town. Consequently, this oversight should now be remedied. In addition, whilst existing secondary literature on Georgian Liverpool does consider the Revolutionary War, this too is patchy. At present there is no over-arching study of the town's wartime experience between 1775 and 1783. Instead, different branches of the impact of the conflict are considered in isolation. This includes local opinion and the career of Banastre 'Bloody Ban' Tarleton, an officer who served in the British Legion and allegedly massacred surrendering American forces. 4 There is some limited coverage of the economic impact of the war upon Liverpool too, with Sheila Marriner painting a largely gloomy picture. For her, hostilities closed markets and severed supplies of raw materials. That said, both Marriner and Conway briefly noted that local privateers provided some relief for the town's wartime losses. 5 According to the writer Daniel Defoe, early-eighteenth century Liverpool was 'one of the wonders of Britain'. 6 The town's population grew rapidly from over 5,000 inhabitants in 1700 to almost 90,000 by century's end. 7 This was partially because Liverpool was emerging as the major industrial centre within the North West regional mineral economy, processing Cheshire salt and consuming Lancashire coal. 8 Although not unique, the construction of numerous waterways linked this commercial-industrial hub to its hinterland, and the Mersey estuary arguably became 'the cradle of the canal age'. 9 Hanoverian Liverpool was also linked to the British Atlantic Empire. This association was enhanced in 1709 when construction began of the Old Dock, which was probably Britain's first commercial dock. 10 In 1702 the town owned 8,600 tons of shipping, but by 1788 this figure reached 106,000 tons. 11 Eighteenth century Liverpool was synonymous with the trans-Atlantic slave trade. In terms of the number of vessels dispatched from England to Africa, Liverpool overtook Bristol and London during the 1740s. Several factors contributed to this development, not least that Liverpool was less geographically exposed (although not immune) to enemy vessels during wartime. 12 However, it is possible to over-state the importance of the African market to Liverpool. Extant sources suggest that local merchants often enjoyed diverse portfolios. 13 Consequently, the town was engaged in other business ventures. By 1750 Liverpool stood second only to London in the volume and value of its Anglo-American trade. 14 In this respect, Liverpool literally was the 'second city of empire'. As a result, this northern English town was affected by the outbreak of hostilities in 1775. Liverpool therefore used its political and lobbying organisations, including the local Members of Parliament and the town's first Chamber of Commerce, to protect its American interests. 15 This article acknowledges the valuable contributions made by previous authors in this field, but provides a more detailed account of the economic impact of the American War upon Liverpool. Conway pointed out that when analysing the economic fallout from eighteenth century warfare, 'such is the complexity and range of the issues to be weighed that a proper audit is probably impossible'. 16 However, some more definitive calculations can be reached for Liverpool c.1775-1783. The first part of this article analyses the patterns of the town's overseas commerce.
Shipping and duty figures reveal four general phases between 1775 and 1783.
Initially, Liverpool's overseas trade remained broadly steady. Then there was a noticeable decline. The third phase was marked by a sluggish improvement. Finally, it was not until the post-war period that the town's foreign commerce made a stronger recovery. However, it should be stressed that this quadrilateral structure is a broad generalisation of the overall data. Closer inspection of other sources, such as ship's muster rolls and the profits of local slave traders, suggest that individual markets had their own dynamics -rising and falling at different times. Marriner and Conway rightly suggested that privateering offered some explanation for Liverpool's eventual rebound in overseas trade. However, seizing enemy vessels was extremely hazardous. Henceforth, other factors such as the restoration of peace in 1783 contributed towards Liverpool's recovery. Because the town was closely intertwined with the larger Atlantic World, the American War disrupted several lines of commerce.
Thus, to gain a broader understanding of the economic impact of the revolt, this article considers some of Liverpool's other major overseas markets, namely the African-West Indian nexus and mainland Europe. 17 The second part of this article considers the broader effects of the war upon other branches of Liverpool's economy. Regrettably, there is virtually no surviving evidence of how local agriculture and banking responded to this crisis, but there is data on bankruptcies, shipbuilding, and infrastructure projects. Analyses of these particular sectors illustrate different patterns to overseas trade, but are nevertheless explainable.
This diversity of economic experiences contributes towards a larger historiographical debate. A.H. John argued that 'war in the first half of the eighteenth century exerted, on the whole, a beneficial influence'. It nurtured technological innovation, increased access to new supplies of raw materials, and war-induced investment stimulated demand. However, John was more cautious about extolling the benefits of warfare in the latter decades of the century. 18 In starker contrast, T.S. Ashton wrote: 'If England had enjoyed unbroken peace the Industrial Revolution might have come earlier.'
Warfare disrupted the smooth running of business and diverted resources from domestic economic development. 19 On the whole, the data presented here confirms that the economic impact of the American War upon Liverpool's foreign trade and local domestic economy was mixed. There were winners and losers in the town, thereby supporting both Ashton's and John's assertions.
Shipping and duty figures:
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Muster rolls:
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Another source is a ship's muster roll, which outlines the composition of the crew and states from where the vessel sailed. Table 3 shows the number of rolls for vessels arriving at Liverpool, 1774-1785. There are some limitations with these muster rolls, as they do not always reflect multiple destinations. Nor do the totals in Table 3 equate with those in Table 1 - evidently some muster rolls have been lost. But Table 3 is still useful in two respects.
Firstly, it shows the totals for each year, which supports the four-stage model. 
Declining trade with the Thirteen Colonies to 1779
At the start of 1775 both sides of the Atlantic still exchanged business correspondence. For example, in February the Gildart family of Liverpool, who were merchants, wrote to Robert Carter of Virginia, concerning quantities of pig iron. But the Gildarts were vexed by the deteriorating situation. The colonial embargo on British goods was highly detrimental, and made 'innocent individuals suffer for government grievances'. 25 Nevertheless, the data from the muster rolls shows that
Liverpool still traded with the colonies, at least initially. In 1774 there were 39 entries, and 41 the following year.
But very soon there was a drop in the number of vessels sailing from the thirteen colonies to Liverpool. This is unsurprising, given that the war was fought over these territories. Henceforth, there are only eleven surviving entries for 1776 -a decrease of 30 muster rolls from the previous year. There were multiple reasons for this downturn. As British authority in the colonies collapsed the US Congress took over, and the resulting boycotts of British goods achieved their intended results. A Virginian Congressman claimed that several Liverpool ships had sailed to America in 1775, but that they had been sent back. 26 Furthermore, there were violent reprisals against British properties in the colonies. The Totness, owned by the Gildarts, ran aground in Maryland in 1775 and was burned by the rebels. 27 Decisions taken in London in late-1775 also hindered Liverpool's trading relationship with the colonies.
Under the Prohibition of Trade Act, British vessels could still sail to America, but only if they had special licenses granted by the UK government. Between 1775 and 1776 a handful of vessels supplied with coal did sail from Liverpool to Boston under these conditions (presumably to re-supply British troops stationed in Boston). 28 But by 1779 there was a clear downturn in Liverpool's trade with America - Table 3 registers only six entries for the Thirteen Colonies that year. Yet, as we shall see, British trade to the American colonies did not cease entirely.
Rising then declining trade with Europe to 1781
Between 1775 and 1776 there was an increase in the number of vessels arriving in Thus, there were other factors that contributed towards this decline, which included attacks by American shipping. One Liverpudlian captain recalled that when colonial privateers captured British slave trading vessels, they engaged in economic warfare by selling their human cargoes at discounted prices. This was an attempt to undercut British slave traders. 35 Because of the uncertainty of wartime, merchants hoped that their captains would make short remittances. 36 Nonetheless, by 1777, some bills of exchange (written orders) remained valid for as long as two years. 37 At the same time, problems were exacerbated by the rising cost of maritime insurance. 38 Arguably www.slavevoyages.org. www.slavevoyages.org Whilst this data does not neatly conform to the four-stage pattern, it does show that the war produced mixed economic results. On the one hand, the cost of this forced African labour declined after 1775, and pre-war prices were not reached again until 1782. This was surely bad news for the slave traders. Yet, on the other hand, the price of these slaves actually rose in 1778.
One way to combine this body of evidence is to look at the profits from the slave Tables 1, 2 , and 3, as well as Figures 1 and 2 -although the precise years vary. Tables 1, 2 Another factor that weakened privateering's contribution towards Liverpool's commercial rebound was that these vessels were not active throughout the war. Congress. In the event, as Table 4 shows, it was not until 1777 that Liverpool's privateering activities resumed. Table 3 indicates that the number of surviving Liverpool privateer muster rolls reached double digits in 1779 and 1780. This increase took place after an Order in Council in the second half of 1778, which granted a privateering war against France. The issuing of privateering commissions against Spain also began in summer 1779. 58 Table 3 illustrates a clear increase in local privateering activity between 1780 and 1781, rising from 13 to 20 muster rolls.
The recovery in overseas trade and the role of privateering
This coincided with the onset of the Anglo-Dutch War in December 1780. Indeed, there was approval amongst Liverpool businesses for preying upon the Dutch, who were believed to be a rich commercial power. 59 Crucially however, in terms of the Table 4 highlights the composition of Liverpool's prizes. 
Additional factors behind this recovery
Hence other elements besides privateering contributed towards the town's sluggish improvement in overseas trade during the early-1780s. One potential contribution was smuggling, but this is obviously difficult to assess. Another possible source of relief was merchants re-directing their trade. 62 Another factor that may have helped Liverpool's business community was that it could gain from government requisitioning of private vessels. Owing to colonial resistance, the British army in America encountered difficulties living off the land.
Therefore, these forces had to be re-supplied from the British Isles. 64 To that end, the UK government chartered numbers of merchant ships, which potentially yielded financial pay-offs for local businesses. In 1776 two privately-owned transports were forthcoming from Liverpool, but it seems that no other private vessels were supplied to the state from the town. Some Liverpool-registered vessels were foreign-built, and therefore ineligible to sail in American waters under the Navigation Acts. Equally, other Liverpudlian ships proved unsuitable for government service because they were designed specifically for the African and Greenland (whaling) trades. 65 There were other alternative sources of relief. Whilst the evidence is fragmented, it seems that some Liverpool-based companies restructured themselves. For example, prior to 1775 Rawlinson & Chorley consisted of only two partners. By 1780 they were named Rawlinson, Chorley & Gregson. 66 Advertisements in the local press prior to the rebellion show that the firm dealt primarily with the Americas. 67 Thus, they were especially vulnerable to the disturbances in the colonies. It is likely that a new partner was brought in to replace depleted capital and reduce personal risk. One author suggested that local businesses re-trenched by seeking cheaper alternatives. 68 Indeed, one of Davenport's vessels was damaged in 1781, and was subsequently repaired in Londonderry. This was because wages and timbers were cheaper there than in Liverpool. 69 However, as we shall see, retrenchment was not always successful, as some local merchants became bankrupts during the war.
Lobbying for naval provision theoretically contributed towards the improvement in
Liverpool's overseas trade. During the American War, the town's Chamber of Commerce sent numerous petitions to the Admiralty calling for convoys. On 1
February 1776 the lobby requested that the Navy guard homeward bound ships from the West Indies. The Admiralty responded by providing convoys up to 120 Leagues clear of Jamaica. Although this was a positive step the Liverpool merchants wanted more, and by August they called for further protection. Convoys were later appointed for outward and homeward bound trade with the West Indies. 70 But the effectiveness of convoy protection was questionable. Crowhurst argued that whilst the Admiralty became more adept at organizing commercial defence during the eighteenth century, the American War was especially challenging as Britain faced multiple opponents with few allies. Slaving vessels were especially difficult to protect, as they took varying time to load cargoes, and rarely left Africa in groups. 71 Developments on the battlefield contributed towards Liverpool's recovery. Although
British troops evacuated Boston in 1776, they re-took New York the same year, Philadelphia in 1777, and Charleston in 1780. These victories re-opened American towns to British commerce, and as such 75 Only with the final arrival of peace after 1783 did Liverpool's overseas trade witness a significant recovery. Table 1 shows the total number of vessels in Liverpool rising from 349 in 1783-1784 to 404 in 1785-1786. 
Other branches of the Liverpool economy
The war impacted upon other branches of the Liverpool economy, which was not always positive. Table 5 outlines the number and composition of Liverpool bankrupts for the decade after 1774. Owing to the initial relative continuation of overseas trade, one might have expected bankruptcy in Liverpool to be lower at the start of the conflict. However, this was not the case. Table 5 suggests that at the start of the conflict in 1775 there was a total of nine new bankrupts in the town -but by 1778 this figure had increased to twenty. Indeed, the rising incidence of business failure coincided with the initial anxiety of wartime dislocation. The restoration of peace also demanded readjustments, and therefore some companies lost out from the termination of government contracts. 76 Another reason why the Liverpool bankruptcy figures do not correspond with fluctuations in overseas trade is because manufacturers and retailers constituted a larger total number of bankrupts than overseas merchants (59 to 49). That is not to say that manufacturing had no interest in overseas trade, but manufacturers made goods for domestic consumption too -not just foreign markets
Conversely, some areas of the local economy did well during the war years.
Shipyards benefited from the multiplier effect of rising government expenditure. The core of Georgian Britain's shipbuilding was the Royal Dockyards. However, the rising incidence of warfare during the Long Eighteenth Century meant that it became more common to use private contractors to supplement the construction of naval vessels.
Liverpool had seven such private contractors by the 1770s, and they made an important contribution towards the war effort. 86 This argument is partially substantiated by Table 5 , which
shows that manufacturers and merchants (groups that sponsored the canal) were amongst Liverpool's bankrupts during the war years. Yet if the Leeds-Liverpool
Canal was adversely affected during this period, the American War was but one factor amongst many that caused problems on the canal. Waterway construction was necessarily expensive, as labourers had to be paid and compensation awarded to those inconvenienced. 87 The most expensive measure taken by this canal company was the purchasing of the Douglas Navigation in 1772, which improved access to Wigan. 88 As a result, by 1784 the Leeds-Liverpool company was £18,000 in debt. 89 1790s also witnessed the development of markets that were important to Liverpool's nineteenth century economy, such as the corn and cotton trades. 94 Despite the economic dislocation of the Revolution, the American market grew in importance for
Liverpool. Hence the port became the largest exporter of cotton manufactures to the US by 1806 -even overtaking London. This was partially because subsequent improvements in Liverpool's shipping and banking facilities made the town more
